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At the end of March 2021 President Biden published the “American Jobs Plan” (AJP). It runs to 
11,000 words and presents an investment programme of more than $3 trillion in infrastructure, 
public services and labour conditions. 4 It was followed in April 2021 by the American Families Plan 
(AFP), with a further programme of investment in education, childcare, and maternity leave. 5  
The actual implementation of the plan is subject to the political processes of the USA, but the 
structure and narratives of the AJP are of great interest not only in America but for the rest of the 
world. It is structured around democratic planning of infrastructure and public services, in pursuit of 
public missions of full employment, equality, social care, and a green economy, framed in terms of 
class, race, gender, and climate change, committed to raising wages and increasing unionisation, to 
be financed by increased taxes on corporations and the rich. It is shaped not simply as a Keynesian 
macro-economic reflationary tool, but as a public plan using economic resources to deliver public 
social objectives. 
This is very different from the neoliberal narratives of the last 30 years, under which the function of 
the state is to manage an economy driven by corporate interests. The AJP is the biggest departure 
from these principles in a generation. And it has been articulated by the president of the USA.  
The USA proposals about global investment in infrastructure at the G7 summit in July 2021, aimed at 
countering the growing influence of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), did not recommend to the 
rest of the world the use of the same approach as the AJP. Instead, they were based on the hope 
that private finance can be enticed into investing in infrastructure in developing countries, a policy 
which has failed for the last 30 years. The proposals have been widely criticised as lacking specifics 
and doomed to failure. 
The AJP model nevertheless represents an opportunity for progressive parties and social movements 
around the world to adopt the narratives and approach of the AJP, and argue for the adoption of 
‘Biden plans’ in other countries, including low and middle-income countries (LMIC): social and 
economic strategies based on democratic planning for public infrastructure and services to deliver 
full employment, equality, environmental respect, and universal public services. 
  
 
4 ‘FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan’. 2021. The White House. 31 March 2021. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-
plan/. 








The first section of this report analyses the AJP from a global perspective, to identify the ways in 
which its core narratives represent a significant break from the neoliberal framework which has 
dominated national and global economic policy debates for the last 30 years.   
The second section of this paper discusses the USA’s proposals at the G7 summit on global 
infrastructure investment, which were explicitly aimed at countering the growing influence of 
China’s BRI, but did not use  the same approach as the AJP. Instead they were based on the ’hope’ 
that private finance can be enticed into investing in infrastructure in developing countries, a policy 
which has been failing for the last 30 years. The proposals have been widely criticised as lacking 
specifics and doomed to failure as a challenge to China’s BRI. 
The final section argues that this represents a missed opportunity to encourage LMIC and other 
countries to formulate their own versions of the AJP.  The AJP model nevertheless represents an 
opportunity for social movements and progressive political parties around the world to argue for 
‘Biden plans’: social and economic strategies based on democratic planning for public infrastructure 
and services, including full employment, equality, and a ‘Green New Deal’6 
B. Implementation of the AJP in the USA 
This paper does not attempt to analyse or evaluate the origins of the AJP in USA politics, or the 
political processes  around its implementation in the USA itself.  But it is worth noting that it has 
been very positively received by the public, with polls showing 2-1 majority support, which has 
continued undiminished up to the time of writing (August 2021).7 President Biden responded to 
opposition from Republican politicians, by negotiating a bipartisan ‘infrastructure deal’, worth about 
$550 billion, which is limited to investments in physical infrastructure such as water and highways. 
This excludes major elements of the AJP concerned with housing, care, climate change, and tax 
increases, and intense pressure from the finance sector added the possibility of using PPPs,8 9  But 
 
6 The concept of the ‘Green New Deal’ combines the demand for a radical response to the climate crisis by 
shifting to renewable energy, with the memory of the programme of economic recovery introduced in the 
1930s under President Roosevelt, known as the ‘New Deal’.  
7 The proposals were popular from the outset and have remained so. For their initial popularity see  ‘Voters 
Like Biden Infrastructure Plan’ The New York Times, 15 April 2021 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/15/business/economy/infrastructure-economy-biden.htmls  ; in late July 
2021, when polls showed Biden’s own approval rating had fallen sharply, the same polls showed that the AJP 
itself still had a remarkable 71% approval rating: ‘New Poll Shows Biden Approval In Full On Nose Dive’. Daily 
Caller 29 July 2021. https://dailycaller.com/2021/07/29/joe-biden-poll-monmouth-university-approval-rating/. 
8 For analysis of the provision for considering PPPs, see ‘Infrastructure Summer: In Bipartisan Bill, States Must 
Consider Private Financing for Major Transit Projects’. The American Prospect. 2 August 2021. 
https://prospect.org/api/content/4fd81084-f17d-11eb-8505-1244d5f7c7c6/ ; for the private equity bids for 
utilities see Harris, Lee. 2021. ‘Eyeing Federal Infrastructure Windfall, Private Equity Courts Public Utilities’. The 
American Prospect. 22 July 2021. https://prospect.org/api/content/40114d86-ea4e-11eb-b8dc-
1244d5f7c7c6/. For assessment of the success in resisting PPPs and privatisation see Dayen, David. 2021. 
‘Infrastructure Summer: One Deal Forward, One Deal Back’. The American Prospect. 29 July 2021. 
https://prospect.org/api/content/5f11f968-f06d-11eb-9ef3-1244d5f7c7c6/. For part of the resistance, see 
‘Progressive Groups Urge Democratic Leadership to Reject Privatization Provisions of Bipartisan Infrastructure 
Framework’. 2021. Indivisible. 15 July 2021. https://www.facebook.com/indivisibleguide/.   
9 For the formal announcement on the bipartisan infrastructure deal, see ‘FACT SHEET: Historic Bipartisan 




the ’human infrastructure’ aspects of  the AJP is  covered by a parallel budget bill passed by the 
House of representatives – estimated at $3.5 trillion - to implement other parts of the AJP, including, 
for example a ‘surprisingly radical housing policy’. 10 needing Republican support. It too is the subject 
of intense lobbying by private equity firms, resisted by proposals to limit private equity’s ability to 
extract value from e.g. care services at the expense of workers and care standards.  
  
 
room/statements-releases/2021/07/28/fact-sheet-historic-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal/. For overall 
assessments of the deal see Dayen, David. 2021. ‘Infrastructure Summer: One Deal Forward, One Deal Back’. 
The American Prospect. 29 July 2021. https://prospect.org/api/content/5f11f968-f06d-11eb-9ef3-
1244d5f7c7c6/ ; Bloomberg.Com. 2021. ‘Senate Poised to Deliver Infrastructure Win for Biden Agenda’, 2 
August 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-02/senate-poised-to-deliver-infrastructure-
win-for-biden-s-agenda ; for a summary of which parts of the AJP are excluded from the $550bn deal, see 
‘Which Biden Priorities Are Not Included in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal?’ Washington Post, 29 July 2021 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/01/biden-bipartisan-deal-infrastructure-spending/.  The 
parallel budget bill was passed by the House of representatives on 23rd August:  ‘House Narrowly Passes $3.5 
Trillion Budget Blueprint, Paving the Way to Enact Biden’s Expansive Agenda.’ The New York Times, 24 August 
2021, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/24/us/biden-democrats-politics-news ; for the private 
equity lobbying and contestation see Dayen, David. 2021. ‘Private Equity’s Potential Payday From Build Back 
Better’. The American Prospect, 31 August 2021. https://prospect.org/api/content/00018b1e-09e5-11ec-95d7-
1244d5f7c7c6/. 
10 See Dayen, David. 2021. ‘Infrastructure Summer: The Sophie’s Choice of the Reconciliation Bill’. The 
American Prospect, 15 September 2021. https://prospect.org/api/content/abff9e06-15a2-11ec-b9b3-
1244d5f7c7c6/ ; Kuttner, Robert. ‘A Grand Bargain on Infrastructure and Saving Democracy?’ The American 
Prospect, 15 September 2021. https://prospect.org/api/content/b03a899c-164f-11ec-81da-1244d5f7c7c6/ ; 
‘Biden’s Build Back Better Plan Is First and Foremost a Jobs Plan’. The American Prospect, 17 September 2021. 
https://prospect.org/api/content/41ec9cc4-1734-11ec-9afe-1244d5f7c7c6/; Sammon, Alexander. 2021. 






2. The AJP and its key narratives  
A. Key narratives 
The size and scale of the AJP are economically impressive – about 1% of GDP for the next 8 years -  
but it is not the size which represents such a break with neoliberal orthodoxy.  Nor is its impact as an 
economic stimulus, which is smaller because it is intended to be largely financed by taxation. 11  It is 
shaped not simply as a Keynesian macro-economic reflationary tool, but as a public plan using 
economic resources to deliver public social objectives. 
The AJP’s key features are rather that it is structured around democratic planning of infrastructure 
and public services, in pursuit of public missions of full employment, equality, social care, and a 
green economy, framed in terms of class, race, gender, and climate change, committed to raising 
wages and increasing unionisation, to be financed by increased taxes on corporations and the rich. It 
is the commitment to these public objectives which leads to the formulation of such a large and 
ambitious programme 
 This section looks at the distinctive narratives of the AJP under 5 broad headings:  
• the key role for planning, and public sector missions  
• based on a wide range of public missions – including a ‘Green New Deal’, full 
employment, healthcare and social care policies, housing, racial and gender equality, 
all treated as ‘infrastructure investment’  
• the importance of public sector capacity 
• public finance through taxation of profits and high incomes, with no role for PPPs12 ;  
• a central commitment to full employment, higher wages and unionisation of workers 
 
B.  A plan: the power of the state 
One simple notable feature of the AJP is that it’s a plan. Planning has been “deeply discredited” as a 
failed Soviet approach since the 1980s 13, though the financial crisis, the scale of state action 
required by Covid, and the dysfunctionality of privatisation suggest that neoliberal economic 
management replicates rather than solves the problems of the Soviet state 14.   Biden has now 
launched a series of plans since he became president in January 2021.  
 
11 As noted by Paul Krugman: Krugman, Paul. 2021. ‘Opinion | Wonking Out: Keynesian Republicans, Supply-
Side Democrats?’ The New York Times, 30 July 2021, sec. Opinion. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/30/opinion/american-rescue-plan-stimulus-keynes.html. 
12 In the original plan: as noted above, the ‘infrastructure deal’ of July 2021 includes the possibility of states 
evaluating the potential for PPPs 
13 “the idea of national economic planning has been deeply discredited” M.Ellman 2014 Socialist Planning p.19  
14 “the neoclassical economics that justifies public sector outsourcing operates with a closed-system ontology 
of the economy that has more affinities with Stalinist central planning than to empirical political economic 
science” Innes, Abby. 2020. ‘The Limits of Institutional Convergence: Why Public Sector Outsourcing Is Less 





The first was the American Rescue Plan (ARP), his initial Covid economic support and recovery 
stimulus in January 2021.15 The AJP is thus Biden’s second major plan (and includes tax policies 
which are themselves presented as a plan-within-a-plan, the ‘Made in America Tax Plan’).  It was 
followed at the end of April 2021 by the American Families Plan (AFP), which set out a further 
programme of investment in pre-school and post-school education, childcare, paid maternity and 
sick leave, food schemes, and unemployment and healthcare insurance. 16 
It is not just a set of proposals. The AJP proclaims itself as an historic national mission, in which the 
state is identified with the people, and the plan identified with the president: 
“Like great projects of the past, the President’s plan will unify and mobilize the country to 
meet the great challenges of our time”. 
The plan itself is the lead actor throughout, ‘a historic public investment’ which will ‘repair American 
roads and bridges’, ‘modernize public transit’, ‘Build, preserve, and retrofit more than two million 
homes’ etc., repeatedly mentioning its status as ‘President Biden’s plan’.   
The role of the state as a strategic and directing actor in the social and economic future of the 
country is thus at the centre of the whole programme.17   
The language of the market, competition and incentives, by contrast, is much less used, and often as 
an area of weakness rather than a source of solutions. Competition is mainly used in the sense of 
competition between countries, and when it is mentioned in the context of inter-company 
competition it is as a problematic area, whose solutions include releasing the potential of the public 
sector “by lifting barriers that prevent municipally-owned or affiliated providers and rural electric co-
ops from competing on an even playing field”.  And In his speech on the economy in late May 2021, 
President Biden reverses the mainstream view of competition as a mechanism which reduces 
employment by cutting costs, and instead argues that an investment programme which aims at 
delivering full employment leads to employers competing for labour, thus strengthening the 
bargaining position of workers: “We want the companies to compete to attract workers. That kind of 
competition in the market doesn’t just give workers more ability to earn a higher wage, it gives them 
the power to demand to be treated with dignity and respect in the workplace”.  
The word ‘market’ is mentioned only 10 times, often as an area of problems - e.g. the USA market 
for electric vehicles lags behind that of China, but the plan “will create good jobs electrifying 
vehicles” – or to emphasise the power of state spending: e.g. the plan “will use the federal 
government’s incredible purchasing power to drive clean energy deployment across the market”, 
 
15 ‘Fact Sheet: American-Rescue-Plan.Pdf’.  President. January 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/American-Rescue-Plan-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
16 ‘Fact Sheet: The American Families Plan’. 2021. The White House. 28 April 2021. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-the-american-
families-plan/. 
17 The Biden AJP was published in March 2021, at the same time as China approved its 14th 5 year plan (5YP), 
summarised at ‘China: Report on the Work of the Government’. 2021. 
http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/202103/13/content_WS604b9030c6d0719374afac02.html.  The AJP 
is on a relatively smaller scale than China’s 5YP: its investments will amount to about 1% of GDP per year, 
whereas China’s infrastructure investment has been running at over 5% of GDP.  ‘Government Investment 
Spending | Government at a Glance 2019 | OECD ILibrary’. April 2021. https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/sites/9cc7e2ae-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9cc7e2ae-en . The AJP covers a longer 
time-span - 8 years rather than 5; some of the fundamental public missions are the same, notably climate 
change, social care, and employment; and the AJP names president Biden 90 times, while the 5YP mentions 




and even more assertively “The federal government spends more than a half-a-trillion dollars buying 
goods and services each year. As a result, it has the ability to be a first mover in markets. This 
incredible purchasing power can be used to drive innovation and clean energy production, as well as 
to support high quality jobs.”  The AJP still includes tax breaks as ‘Incentives’ e.g. tax credits to 
“mobilize private investment to modernize our power sector”, but notes that such incentives may be 
perverse and so are surrounded by conditionalities, mainly connected to jobs. 
C.  Public missions: climate, care, connectivity, equality and employment 
The plan is rooted in the provision of public infrastructure and public service systems to deliver some 
great public ‘missions’, including climate change and racial inequality, and supporting the interests 
of workers in higher wages, better employment conditions, and unionisation. These include: 
• comprehensive infrastructure networks: roads, water, energy, universal broadband  
• climate change and a ‘green new deal’: renewable energy, public transit, electric vehicles 
• social care,  more public healthcare, affordable housing 
• racial and gender equality  
• full employment, higher wages, and stronger unionisation 
The American Families Plan (AFP) at the end of April 2021 continued this process by setting out a 
further programme of investment in pre-school and post-school education, childcare, paid maternity 
and sick leave, food schemes, and unemployment and healthcare insurance. 18 Biden’s plans are 
effectively indicating how investment in ‘human infrastructure’ should be coupled with physical 
infrastructure.  
The scope and scale of these plans are comparable to the ‘new deal’ in the USA of the 1930s, and to 
the post-WWII social democratic reforms in Europe. They are shaped not simply as a Keynesian 
macro-economic reflationary tool, but repeatedly directed to deliver public social objectives.  
 






Table/chart 1.  Rebuilding the USA economy through public services – the AJP + AFP (2021) 
 
Source: IMF 19 
D. Public services as infrastructure 
One big narrative change in the AJP is to extend the notion of infrastructure, beyond the physical 
networks of roads and electricity grids, to include the workers and organisations for delivering public 
services, and the public benefits of doing so e.g. through:  “$400bn on care for the elderly and 
people with disabilities. $100bn will go on job training for disadvantaged groups…. This is a wide 
programme of economic reform, which encompasses education and climate change abatement.”  20  
Biden’s new definition of public service infrastructure includes its role in providing decent 
employment, equal rights and R&D: 
 
19IMF. 2021. ‘Boosting the Economy: The Impact of US Government Spending Plans’. IMF. 1 July 2021. 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/07/01/na070121-boosting-the-economy-the-impact-of-us-
government-spending-plans. 





“We need to start seeing infrastructures through its effect on the lives of working people in 
America … the foundation today that they need to carve out their place in the middle class 
to make it — to live, to go to work, to raise their families with dignity, to ensure that good 
jobs will be there for their kids, no matter who they are or what ZIP Code they live in…  
It’s expanded services for seniors.  It’s homecare workers, who go in and cook their meal, 
help them get around and live independently in their home, allowing them to stay in their 
homes … It’s better wages and benefits and opportunities for caregivers, who are 
disproportionately women, women of colour, and immigrants.”21  22 
It is this aspect of the AJP that led the FT to describe it as  “a wide programme of economic 
reform”23., and has been most strongly opposed by the Republican party.  
 
E. An embedded Green New Deal 
This notion of infrastructure even extends to the natural environment itself: “President Biden’s plan 
will protect and, where necessary, restore nature-based infrastructure – our lands, forests, wetlands, 
watersheds, and coastal and ocean resources.”  This is presented as investments to “make our 
infrastructure more resilient”.  
The AJP includes large amounts of climate-focussed investments, and was welcomed by those who 
had been campaigning for a ‘Green New Deal’:  
“Varshini Prakash of the Sunrise Movement, one of the main activist groups pushing for the 
Green New Deal, applauded multiple aspects of Biden's climate policy” including the plan to 
create green jobs through a ‘Civilian Climate Corps’, which was “something that we didn't 
anticipate being a priority for the administration right away". Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez also 
said that, although the amount should be much higher: “I do believe that we have been able 
to influence a lot of thinking on climate and infrastructure. As much as I think some parts of 
the party try to avoid saying 'Green New Deal' and really dance around and try to not use 
that term, ultimately, the framework I think has been adopted." 24    
 
21 ‘Remarks by President Biden on the American Jobs Plan’. 2021. The White House. 7 April 2021. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/07/remarks-by-president-biden-on-
the-american-jobs-plan-2/. 
22 Biden Agrees to Bipartisan Group’s Infrastructure Plan, Saying ‘We Have a Deal’. The New York Times. 12 
August 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/24/us/joe-biden-news 
23 FT editorial. 2021. ‘Joe Biden’s Infrastructure Plan Is Much More than That’. 7 April 2021. 
https://www.ft.com/content/524db71d-64c3-4bb0-ab5b-648be37aa2e3. 
24 Danielle Kurtzleben. 2021. ‘Ocasio-Cortez Sees Green New Deal Progress In Biden Plan, But “It’s Not 






Source: ‘The American Jobs Plan Gets Serious about Infrastructure and Climate Change’. CSIS. 2 April 2021. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/american-jobs-plan-gets-serious-about-infrastructure-and-climate-change. 
The AJP includes a commitment to “upgrade America’s research infrastructure”, endorsing the role 
of the state in R&D as a core public mission, both in the past and in the future: 
“Investing in research and development help lead to lithium batteries, LED technology, the 
Internet itself.  It helped lead to vaccine breakthroughs that are helping us beat COVID-19; to 
the Human Genome Project, which has led to breakthroughs in how we understand and 
fight cancer and other diseases.  Government — meaning, the taxpayers — funded this 




the future, and we give up leading the world.  And when we do invest in research, what 
we’re really doing is raising the bar on what we can imagine.“ 25  
F. Full employment 
The commitment to full employment is perhaps most radical break with neoliberal orthodoxy. Biden 
has now asserted that the welfare and wages of working families is not just a central but ‘the only’ 
measure of economic policy- and so full employment, under which companies have to compete for 
workers by offering better pay and conditions, is a core objective:   
“My sole measure of economic success is how working families are doing, whether they have 
jobs that deliver dignity.  That means we have to focus on wages like we used to.  When it comes 
to the economy we’re building, rising wages aren’t a bug; they’re a feature.  We want to get 
something economists call “full employment.”  Instead of workers competing with each other for 
jobs that are scarce, we want the companies to compete to attract workers.  That kind of 
competition in the market doesn’t just give workers more ability to earn a higher wage, it gives 
them the power to demand to be treated with dignity and respect in the workplace….“Full 
employment” also means more options and opportunities for workers — including Black, 
Hispanic workers, Asian American workers, women — who’ve been left behind in previous 
economic recoveries when the labor market never tighten- — tightened up enough.  
Look, this isn’t just good for individual workers, it also makes our economy a whole lot 
stronger.  When American workers have more money to spend, American businesses 
benefit.  We all benefit.  Higher wages and more options for workers are a good thing.” 26  
The role of public services infrastructure in creating well-paid jobs forms part of this approach, so 
that delivery of more and better care services to more people is based on a commitment to:  
“Solidify the infrastructure of our care economy by creating jobs and raising wages and benefits for 
essential home care workers.” 27 
G.  Public sector capacity as infrastructure 
The AJP recognises the importance of building public sector capacity to deliver these missions, both 
for democratic planning, and for managing the provision of public infrastructure and services.  In a 
later speech Biden asserted that this is a distinctive necessary role for the state, that the private 
sector does not deliver:  
“We know from history that these kinds of investments raise both the floor and the ceiling 
of the economy for everybody. Like, when we brought electricity to every household in the 
country in 1930s or we connected the country through the Interstate Highway System in the 
 
25 ‘Remarks by President Biden on the American Jobs Plan’. 2021. The White House. 7 April 2021. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/07/remarks-by-president-biden-on-
the-american-jobs-plan-2/. 
26 Remarks by President Biden on the Economy  May 27, 2021  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/speeches-remarks/2021/05/27/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-economy-2/ 






’50s…..These are generational investments.  Private sector does not make these kind of 
investments.  We’ve neglected that kind of public investment for much too long.” 28 
Although the plan is set out by central government, its detailed implementation will be carried out 
by regional and local governments, using democratic mechanisms. Thus the federal government:  
“will support the state, local, and tribal governments delivering these projects through 
world-class training, technical assistance, and procurement best practices. In addition, the 
President’s plan will use smart, coordinated infrastructure permitting to expedite federal 
decisions while prioritizing stakeholder engagement, community consultation, and 
maximizing equity, health, and environmental benefits.” 
The plan generally leaves it open as to whether service provision should be by direct public 
employees or outsourced to contractors, but In relation to the extension of universal affordable 
broadband, it “prioritizes support for broadband networks owned, operated by, or affiliated with 
local governments, non-profits, and co-operatives”.  
H. Public finance not PPPs 
The $2 trillion+ programme set out in the AJP is fully funded from taxation, and specifically through 
increased taxation on corporate profits, including raising the corporate tax rate to 28%, setting a 
minimum tax payment rule, and stopping the use of tax avoidance schemes which switch profits to 
tax havens: 
“Together these corporate tax changes will raise over $2 trillion over the next 15 years and 
more than pay for the mostly one-time investments in the American Jobs Plan and then 
reduce deficits on a permanent basis” 
The AJP itself does not envisage any role for PPPs. 29 And it will not even involve government 
borrowing – rather the opposite, because after the investments are completed, the tax changes will 
“then reduce deficits on a permanent basis”.  
This is of great global significance.  
Firstly, because it shows that the use of public finance for infrastructure is feasible for any country. 
This entire infrastructure investment programme is being funded by higher taxes, both equivalent to 
1% of GDP – a level of increase in taxation and spending which any country in the world can aspire 
to. These taxes will not only pay for the infrastructure plans, but will continue to provide extra 
income for the government “on a permanent basis”. It also shows that even public borrowing and 
debt is not necessary for financing public infrastructure. It can be paid for out of progressive taxation 
collected from corporations and rich individuals. This is quite contrary to the narratives of the IMF, 
World Bank and others, which are routinely framed around the need to attract private finance. 
Secondly, the AJP also proposed to “encourage other countries to adopt strong minimum taxes on 
corporations, just like the United States, so that foreign corporations aren’t advantaged and foreign 
 
28 Remarks by President Biden on the Economy  May 27, 2021  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/speeches-remarks/2021/05/27/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-economy-2/  
29 Vandevelde, Mark, and Michael Mackenzie. 2021. ‘Investors Lament Being Frozen out of Biden 
Infrastructure Plan’. FT 12 April 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/69107cd2-0521-4400-a3c1-d32880e0253f.  
The bi-partisan ‘infrastructure dea;’ agreed at the end of July 2021 did however allow for VFM comparative 




countries can’t try to get a competitive edge by serving as tax havens.” Taxing US multinationals is 
no longer something opposed by the US government, it is welcomed.  This has already resulted in 
June 2021 in an agreement by G7 countries to a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15%, and a 
requirement that the largest multinationals would have to allocate at least 20% of their profits to 
countries where they make their sales. 3031 
Thirdly, it shows that PPPs are regarded by the government of the USA as expensive and 
undesirable.  The financiers operating ‘infrastructure funds’ with $655bn were hoping for an 
infrastructure programme based on PPPs, with government guaranteeing long-term high returns 
over 25 years. But the AJP “does not envisage a role for the private investors who had once expected 
to be in the driving seat” 32: it is all funded, simply, from taxation. Even the CEO of Blackrock, leading 
promoters of PPPs, acknowledged that this was in the public interest: “If the Biden administration 
wants the cheapest financing costs they will fund projects federally”. 33   
That is equally true for other countries. Funding through taxation is always the cheapest and 
simplest option, and although government borrowing is more expensive for developing countries 
than in the USA, so is private finance: the relative position remains that public finance is cheaper 
than private finance and PPPs.  
One advocate of PPPs has tried to argue that Biden will ultimately need to use PPPs to finance some 
of the plan, pointing out that a similar infrastructure plan by President Eisenhower in the 1950s did 
use some PPPs in the form of toll roads. But, as he also acknowledged, these roads deteriorated 
badly because the PPPs did not spend enough on maintenance. The use of public finance makes it 
easier to avoid that danger, because the continued tax revenues enable maintenance and other 
spending after the initial investment. 34 
I.  For the workers – wages, local jobs and union rights  
In the AJP, the interests of the workers are not just mentioned as acknowledgements of claims by 
one stakeholder, they are repeatedly put at the centre of the rationale for the programme.  Early on 
the AJP declares emphatically:  
“Our workers will build and make things in every part of America, and they will be trained 
for well-paying… good-quality jobs that pay prevailing wages in safe and healthy workplaces 
while ensuring workers have a free and fair choice to organize, join a union, and bargain 
collectively with their employers.” 
Biden has since stated:  
 
30 Giles, Chris. 2021. ‘G7 Strikes Historic Agreement on Taxing Multinationals’. Financial Times, 5 June 2021. 
https://www.ft.com/content/a308bbff-5926-47a1-9202-6263e667511e.  
31 ‘FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan’. 2021. The White House. 31 March 2021. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-
plan/.  
32 Vandevelde, Mark, and Michael Mackenzie. 2021. ‘Investors Lament Being Frozen out of Biden 
Infrastructure Plan’. FT 12 April 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/69107cd2-0521-4400-a3c1-d32880e0253f 
33 Vandevelde, Mark, and Michael Mackenzie. 2021. ‘Investors Lament Being Frozen out of Biden 
Infrastructure Plan’. FT 12 April 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/69107cd2-0521-4400-a3c1-d32880e0253f. 
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“My sole measure of economic success is how working families are doing, whether they 
have jobs that deliver dignity. That means we have to focus on wages like we used to.  When 
it comes to the economy we’re building, rising wages aren’t a bug; they’re a feature.” 35  
Not only will the programme create jobs for Americans, it will use legislation and conditionalities to 
increase wages, strengthen rights to unionisation and collective bargaining, and require all recipients 
of public money to pay ‘prevailing wages’ – the USA version of fair wages, or ILO convention 94, the 
main impact of which is to spread good pay and conditions into the private sector by preventing 
contractors from undercutting labour costs). 36 The AJP was followed a month later by a presidential 
order raising the hourly Minimum Wage for Federal Contractors to $15, which was described by ITPI 
as “delivering racial and gender justice… with the stroke of a pen, up to 390,000 low-wage federal 
workers will have more money in their pockets during a pandemic….The average annual pay increase 
for affected year-round workers will be up to $3,100.” .37 
It treats union rights as part of an economically positive infrastructure. The plan will: 
“Put in place an infrastructure to create good middle-class jobs with a free and fair choice to 
join a union. …. America can and must retain well-paid union jobs and create more of them 
all across the country.”38 
The plan repeatedly uses labour-related conditionalities. Tax credits for companies to invest in clean 
energy generation and storage are “paired with strong labor standards to ensure the jobs created 
are good-quality jobs with a free and fair choice to join a union and bargain collectively.”  
J. Global reception 
Beyond the USA the plan has received some surprisingly positive responses. Both the Financial Times 
and the IMF have given positive assessments of the expected economic benefits, including of the 
proposed tax changes, and the social objectives embedded in the AJP.    
The Financial Times commended the “long view” of an 8-year plan, that it is financed by increased 
taxation, that it strengthens the public sector and reduces inequalities, and even described the AJP 
as just a ‘tentative start’: 
“by tabling an increase in corporation tax, Biden is at least confronting the hard choices of 
economic management…..if Democrats are serious about bringing about a historic turn to 
the left, they cannot lean forever on the crutch of borrowing. The point of a centre-left party 
 
35 Remarks by President Biden on the Economy  May 27, 2021  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/speeches-remarks/2021/05/27/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-economy-2/ 
36 ILO ‘Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 (No. 94) and Recommendation (No. 84)’. 
Publication. 27 October 2008. http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-
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Federal Contractors’. 2021. The White House. 27 April 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2021/04/27/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-issues-an-executive-order-to-
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is to persuade voters to pay for a renovated public realm and a more equitable society. In a 
tentative way, Biden is making a start.”39 
The IMF, which would surely have been extremely critical of such a programme coming from a left-
wing government in a less powerful country, expects the plan to generate a 5.3% boost to GDP over 
the next 3 years, and also welcomed its impact on equality and employment:  
“it is more important than ever to support communities that have been historically 
underserved, marginalized, or affected by poverty. The proposed spending and tax changes 
will benefit female-headed households, who make up a disproportionate share of the poor, 
as well as Black and Hispanic families.… The boost to productivity that these investments will 
produce can support more jobs with sustainably higher wages, in a more equitable 
economy.”40 
 
3. G7 proposals for LMICs: not modelled on the AJP, weak challenge to China’s BRI   
A. The G7 proposals: success on taxation, unconvincing on infrastructure  
The corporate taxation principles of the AJP have been actively promoted internationally by the USA, 
to limit the scope for tax avoidance. At the G7 meeting in June 2021 the USA succeeded in getting 
G7 countries to agree to “the principle of a global minimum rate that ensures multinationals pay tax 
of at least 15% in each country they operate”. 41 
Biden also announced there would be an initiative on financing infrastructure in LMIC (lower and 
middle income) countries across the world, which has however been far less successful. The 
initiative was branded as ‘Build Back Better World’ (B3W), presented as a direct challenge to China’s 
‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI).  It expressed a general aspiration:  “the hope that, together with the 
private sector, other U.S. stakeholders, and G7 partners, B3W will collectively catalyze hundreds of 
billions of dollars of infrastructure investment for low- and middle-income countries in the coming 
years", and promised to “establish a taskforce to develop practical proposals and report back to us in 
the Autumn”.42   
However, the B3W does not use the AJP as a model for LMIC countries. It pays little attention to 
public missions, does not focus on the living standards of workers’ and their households, nor on full 
employment, and does not identify higher corporation tax as the core source of finance.  
The B3W has been widely criticised for its failure to provide any specific structure, and failure to 
offer a serious alternative to the BRI.  The Economist was dismissive: “The idea appears half-
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baked….”.43 Newsweek reported “skepticism and wariness from both experts and officials”, including 
the author of a recent CFR report on how the USA could respond to the BRI, who questioned “our 
ability to implement it”; 44 the Guardian reported similar doubts from a Singapore-based analyst who 
was “sceptical about implementation because of the lack of specifics, including money and the fact 
that the Trump administration had launched similar schemes to no effect”. 45 Reports in India and 
south-east Asia also questioned the lack of detail, so that “the huge question is how will the B3W be 
funded”, and contrasted the G7 aspirations with the existing scale of the BRI; 46 the South China 
Morning post described it as “wrong-headed” and “vacuous”.47 An IMF blog suggested that LMIC 
governments in Africa could help by providing incentives in the form of state subsidies and 
guarantees – which rather emphasised the problem, as this is precisely the formula which has failed 
to work for the last 35 years.48 
B. Failure to understand BRI 
It also fails to understand the sheer scale of the BRI, and its appeal to LMIC countries. This allowed 
China to respond to the G7 initiative later in the month by launching a declaration supporting the 
BRI as an international collaboration for a green and sustainable recovery, signed by 29 countries in 
which the BRI had already invested over USD$500billion.49 
In 2017, not only was roughly 6% World GDP indebted to China, but a good number of developing 
countries owed at least 20% of their nominal GDP to China, to name a few including Kyrgyzstan, 
Cambodia, Niger, Laos, and Zambia. Through the end of 2018, China’s loans to 68 heavily indebted 
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developing countries doubled50, virtually matching the amount of World Bank lending to the same 
nations51.  
China uses its Policy Banks as key lending institutions52. The two main development banks are China 
Development Bank and China EXIM Banks. Beside them are Bank of China, China Construction Bank, 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Majority of them are state-owned. Their state-ness means 
that despite operating commercially, loans are often led or associated with geopolitical and foreign 
affairs objectives. Yet, they also incorporate market-oriented-ness in such loans, behaving much like 
commercial lenders, lending at market terms and non-concessional rates.53 To put into perspective, 
China’s ODF is relatively costly, interest rate at higher average54 than that offered by IMF’s 0.6% and 
World Bank’s 1%. They take the ‘commerce-is-development’ perspective, championing the nation’s 
economic model through loans and their terms and conditions55.  
While WB and IMF’s loans are often tied with reform conditionalities, China declares a ‘Five Nos’ 
when it comes to lending to African countries56, many of which are its biggest debtors. These 
principles in general means no political strings57 and no imposed reform model on Africa58. However, 
considering that China has consistently increased its total lending amounts to low-to-middle income 
countries that are already heavily indebted, many fear that debt levels in these countries are at 
unsustainable levels and given that the terms and conditions attached to China’s loans are ‘special’, 
China’s debtor countries have to pay back more in both financial and non-financial terms59.  
 
Since 2016, policy bank lending has declined. However, tn South East Asia, loans for major 
infrastructure projects in Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia and Malaysia has increased while not 
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much can be seen in the Philippines and Myanmar. There is almost no competition matched by 
European and US counterparts in this area.  
The US and Europe compete with China over South East Asian debts in particular for both political 
and economic reasons. The US uses anti-China rhetoric, motivates WB and IMF to focus more on 
infrastructure loans, reducing processing time, increasing cooperation with Japan, Australia and 
Singapore to improve bid in ASEAN. This is reflected in how Western media focuses and analyses 
China’s political motivation in their loans and how their approach to multilateral loans changes 
recently. Through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s lending for infrastructure has stepped up, 
competing with the US and Europe especially in South East Asia and Africa60.  
How and which a project is labelled as ‘BRI loan’ remains obscure.  In many projects, the financing 
structures and mechanisms are a continuation of approaches utilized since before the BRI existed. . 
This varies greatly depending on the host country. Issues such as national law, local capacity, local 
capital, local political considerations all play a part in shaping project agreements and structures, 
resulting in a range of outcomes. In many cases, Chinese companies which operate and understand 
local processes and capacity would have the advantage. They can bring the project proposals to 
banks in China and quickly, the projects are classified as in BRI.  
 
BRI loans provide future incomes for Chinese entities, not only the direct financiers (state-owned 
banks) but also opportunities for labour and material supply from China (private entities). Under a 
BRI plan to support Angola to build a hydropower plant that provides half of its total electricity 
output, state-owned Gezhouba Group in 2017 secured a contract worth $4.5bn. ICBC provided 85% 
of the capital, and Gezhouba is the EPC contractor. In cases like this there is usually a tendering 
process for contractors. Banks (especially commercial banks) like ICBC will want to see a tendering 
process to ensure that competent and qualified companies are selected. The reality is that Chinese 
companies are often the most attractive in terms of capacity and cost - especially in hydropower, 
which is globally dominated by Chinese companies. Chinese entities also gain from BRI schemes, the 
benefits are not entirely retained by the debtor countries. The BRI is not a programme based on the 
idea of generous charitable ‘donors’ helping poorer countries, but on the idea that deals of mutual 
interest can be agreed. 
 
So the G7 initiative fails to recognise that the BRI consists of a series of commercial deals where 
various public and private companies and banks, on both sides, agree how to invest and deliver 
infrastructure investment, along with some cultural exchanges. Loans charge commercial interest 
rates, but there are no policy conditionalities. BRI schemes can thus be presented by a China as ‘win-
win’ deals, in which parties negotiate a deal which is perceived as of mutual benefit, and these have 
been agreed on an increasing scale over the last 5 years. 61 Inclusive Development International 
emphasises the benefits of trade links and the financial institutions which have been created by or 
brought into the BRI: “Dominant media narratives on the BRI tend to focus on China’s role in major 
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infrastructure projects, but… trade is a major focus of the BRI, and ties directly to infrastructure 
projects that create the physical connectivity that make trade and industrialization possible…in 
compliance with international standards.” 62 
4. Biden plans for LMIC countries? 
The G7 proposals are a missed opportunity.  Instead, the AJP itself could provide a framework for 
LMICs and other countries to invest in public services and infrastructure.  This AJP framework is 
much closer to the development plans advocated by many social movements, than it is to the 
policies currently advocated by the IFIs and major donors.63   
For the first time in decades, it is possible to present relatively progressive plans for development as 
reflecting the approach of the president of the USA, and call attention to this by naming them as 
‘Biden plans’.    
A ‘Biden plan’ for any country could be structured around the following 5 key elements: 
1. Democratic planning and public goods 
o This requires public capacity for democratic planning, and for provision of services, 
at both national and local level  
o Public investment is planned democratically and transparently to achieve agreed 
public missions and interests, such as key economic and social infrastructure, public 
services, and ‘green’ policies to deal with climate change – not by asking private 
companies to identify projects which can be made profitable 
o Substantial and continuing investment (e.g. 1-5% of GDP per year) over a medium to 
long term (5-8 years), driven by a plan devised and implemented by central and local 
government.  
2. Infrastructure: wide range of networks to achieve public missions 
o Programmes will include the traditional core economic and social physical 
infrastructure networks – roads/bridges, energy, water and sanitation (as in the 
Indian election slogan ‘”Sadak, 19ijli, pani”) 
o Also for expansion and creation of broader public goods infrastructure 
▪ public transport: rail, metro, bus, ports/airports 
▪ communications – universal coverage for telecoms, and broadband 
o also for a ‘green new deal’ vs. climate change: renewable energy, electric cars etc  
3. Public services as part of infrastructure:  
o Universal public healthcare systems, a post-Covid priority 
o social care for the elderly, another lesson of Covid, including homes and staff 
o extending education, including pre-school, post-school, and better use of internet 
o Plans require the building of public sector capacity for provision of these services 
4. Workers’ jobs, pay, rights to sick/parental leave, treated as part of investment  
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o more and better local jobs and pay as a public objective, not as a cost burden. India’s 
MGNREGA rural employment guarantee system can also be used as a model for this 
approach 64 
o employment equality as a key element in equality policies against racism, sexism 
o use prevailing wages, decent pay, local jobs as conditions for contracts (following 
the principles of ILO Convention 94 – the global formulation of the USA’s ‘prevailing 
wages’ rules used in the AJP 65) 
5. Public finance, not PPPs: taxation of corporations and rich people  
o financed by additional ‘Biden’ tax on corporations, and rich individuals. Can build on 
the USA wish for common global approach to minimum tax on MNCs  
o avoiding the  use of PPPs, expensive long-term liabilities.   
o can include some government borrowing eg from issuing bonds, or WB loans  
‘matched’ to tax financing 
Instead of the G7 declaration, such plans could be put at the centre of a global new development 
approach, under which international development groups and agencies could provide advice for any 
LMIC country in the world on how to develop and implement Biden plans, including the 
predominantly tax-based financing.  
Many bodies could assist in such support, from development banks to social movements and, as in 
the USA, trade unions. Such combined effort would be seen as responding to domestic political 
missions for achieving full employment and well-paid workers, and contributing to a recovery that is 
both real and much better in terms of its benefits.  It would look very much like a ‘win-win’ 
development, and so a genuinely appealing alternative to the BRI.  
  
 
64 See https://www.nrega.nic.in/netnrega/mgnrega_new/Nrega_home.aspx ; and for a 2021 study on the 
positive impacts in relation to households, water infrastructure, and economic resilience under Covid, see 
https://www.cseindia.org/greater-water-security-more-jobs-lesser-outmigration-what-villages-in-odisha-and-
west-bengal-have-got-from-mgnrega-finds-down-to-earth-survey-10750   
65 ILO. 2008. ‘Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 (No. 94) and Recommendation (No. 84)’. 







Bayliss, Kate, and Maria Jose Romero. 2021. ‘‘Rebuilding Better’, but Better for Whom?’ Eurodad. 
https://www.eurodad.org/rebuilding_better. 
Fact Sheet: American-Rescue-Plan Jan 2021 USA President  https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/American-Rescue-Plan-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
‘FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan’. 2021. The White House. 31 March 2021. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-
american-jobs-plan/. 
‘Fact Sheet: The American Families Plan’. 2021. The White House. 28 April 2021. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-the-
american-families-plan/. 
Remarks by President Biden on the Economy  May 27, 2021  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/speeches-remarks/2021/05/27/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-economy-2/ 
FT editorial. 2021. ‘Joe Biden’s Infrastructure Plan Is Much More than That’. 7 April 2021. 
https://www.ft.com/content/524db71d-64c3-4bb0-ab5b-648be37aa2e3. 
Galbraith, James K. 2021. ‘Will the American Jobs Plan Remake the US Economy? | by James K. 
Galbraith & Elmira Bayrasli’. Project Syndicate. 27 April 2021. https://www.project-
syndicate.org/podcasts/will-the-american-jobs-plan-remake-the-us-economy. 
ILO. 2008. ‘Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 (No. 94) and Recommendation (No. 
84)’. Publication. 27 October 2008. http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-
publications/publications/WCMS_099699/lang--en/index.htm. 
Krugman, Paul. 2021a. ‘Opinion | Bidenomics Is as American as Apple Pie’. The New York Times, 1 
April 2021, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/opinion/biden-infrastructure.html. 
———. 2021b. ‘Opinion | America Needs to Empower Workers Again’. The New York Times, 12 April 
2021, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/12/opinion/us-unions-amazon.html. 
‘The American Jobs Plan Gets Serious about Infrastructure and Climate Change’. 2021. CSIS. 2 April 
2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/american-jobs-plan-gets-serious-about-infrastructure-and-
climate-change. 
Vandevelde, Mark, and Michael Mackenzie. FT 2021. ‘Investors Lament Being Frozen out of Biden 
Infrastructure Plan’. 12 April 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/69107cd2-0521-4400-a3c1-
d32880e0253f. 
 
 
 
